CHALICE: Quantifying the Information Leakage in Cache Attacks via Symbolic Execution accepted to appear in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS). CHALICE formally quantifies the information leakage from execution for a wide variety of cache attacks, including the one used in Spectre like attacks.
ASSET research group members served in the organization of IEEE/IFIP VLSI-SoC 2018 (Michele, registration chair), XXXIII Conference on Design of Circuits and Integrated Systems (DCIS) 2018 (Michele, TPC), DATE 2019 (Michele, TPC), 7th IEEE Non-Volatile Memory Systems and Applications Symposium (NVMSA) 2018 (Chundong, TPC), CPSS 2018 (Sudipta, TPC), RTSS 2018 (Sudipta, TPC), RTAS 2019 (Sudipta, TPC), ASP-DAC 2019 (Sudipta, TPC), ISEC 2019 (Sudipta, TPC), DISSECT 2019 (Sudipta, TPC).
We're looking for highly motivated undergraduate researchers to work on AI/ML Testing and Verification. If you're interested, please drop an email to Sudipta Chattopadhyay with your résumé with the subject "Undergraduate AI/ML position".
We're looking for highly motivated undergraduate researchers to work on analyzing and defending against Timing-channel attacks such as Spectre. If you're interested, please drop an email to Sudipta Chattopadhyay with your résumé with the subject "Undergraduate Timing-channel position".
We're looking for highly motivated post-doctoral researchers to work on analyzing and defending against Timing-channel attacks such as Spectre. If you're interested, please drop an email to Sudipta Chattopadhyay with your résumé and a short research statement with the subject "Postdoc Timing-channel position".
We have proposed oo7 - a low-overhead (below 2%) defense against Spectre attacks based on binary analysis. Our proposed approach is now available in arxiv.1807.05843. To try oo7, send a request here.